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Abstract
This paper discusses the prospects of a dispositional solution to the
Kripke–Wittgenstein rule-following puzzle. Recent attempts to em-
ploy dispositional approaches to this puzzle have appealed to the
ideas of finks and antidotes – interfering dispositions and condi-
tions – to explain why the rule-following disposition is not always
manifested. We argue that this approach fails: agents cannot be sup-
posed to have straightforward dispositions to follow a rule which are
in some fashionmasked by other, contrary dispositions of the agent,
because in all cases, at least some of the interfering dispositions are
both relatively permanent and intrinsic to the agent. The presence
of these intrinsic and relatively permanent states renders the ascrip-
tion of a rule-following disposition to the agent false.
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C. B. Martin and John Heil (1998) claim that they can explain what it is to
possess a rule, and be following a rule, in terms of dispositional capacities
of agents. In particular, they believe their account addresses the concerns
raised by Saul Kripke (1982) – himself expounding ideas of Wittgenstein –
that lead to a sort of scepticism about rule-following.
Kripke’s sceptical problem concerning rule-following may be under-
stood as originating with the following question. Don is a subject who in-
tends by the term ‘plus’ exactly the normal addition function, plus. Van
is a subject who intends by the term ‘plus’ something rather different, a
bent addition function, quus, which may be explained thus: x quus y = x
plus y when x and y are both less than 57, and 5 otherwise. So long as
neither Don nor Van have been given an addition problem with x or y
greater than or equal to 57, then the behaviour of each will be the same.
This is a pre-print of a paper forthcoming in Philosophical Studies, available from
www.springerlink.com.
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So the question is, what facts about Don and Van make it the case that
they mean something different by ‘plus’ (that Don means plus and Van
means quus)?1
A prima facie attractive answer to this question is that Don and Van
differ in their dispositions. Although neither has been give the sum ‘68
plus 57’, they are disposed to give different answers to it. Don’s disposition
is such that he would answer 125, Van’s disposition is such that he would
answer 5.
Kripke himself rejects the dispositional answer, raising three prob-
lems:
(i) The dispositional approach cannot account for the distinction be-
tween making a mistake and adopting a new rule. If a subject Don
were to answer ‘5’ in response to a request to sum 68 and 57, then
he is so disposed. But as a consequence we cannot distinguish be-
tween the case where Don is attempting to follow the normal plus
rule, butmaking a mistake, and the case where Don is correctly fol-
lowing Kripke’s bent quus rule.
(ii) The dispositional approach cannot account for normativity. Dispo-
sitions governwhat a subject actually does. How do they account for
what a subject ought to do?
(iii) Our dispositional states are finitely bounded. But the domain of
rules is infinite. The plus rule applies to numbers that no human
could even entertain let alone add.
The term ‘normativity’ may be thought to raise questions of justifica-
tion, but if we put these on one side – as Martin and Heil do – we see that
(i) and (ii) are two sides of the same coin.2 Rules tell us what the correct
answer is, what answer we ought to give; but dispositions explain what
we actually do. So dispositions and rules cannot be the same. Conversely,
1The discussion of these issues is sometime framed in terms of following a rule and
sometimes in terms of meaning. For current purposes we take the relationship to be as
follows: if Smeans or understands plus by ‘plus’ then when S attempts to answer correctly
a question expressed in the following terms ‘what is x plus y?’ S intends to follow the plus-
rule.
2It should be noted that for Kripke, the issues of justification are in fact a crucial aspect
of the sceptical problem he is attempting to raise: “Ultimately, almost all objections to the
dispositional accounts boil down to this one” (1982, 24). In this paper, however, we are
only focusing on the problem of providing an account of what fact about an agent makes
it the case that they are following one rule rather than another. We have nothing to say
about what justifies the belief that an agent is following one rule rather than another.
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if we were following a rule which corresponds precisely to the disposition
which governs our actual behaviour, then we could never be accused of
making a mistake. For the rule corresponding to the disposition of one
who apparently errs, would be a bent-looking rule, one that deviates from
a straight rule on precisely the occasion of the seeming error.
The infinitude of rules is a different problem. Dispositional accounts
might be thought to be well equipped to explain this feature of rules,
because dispositions are necessarily “connected” to possible manifesta-
tions. The possiblemanifestations of a given disposition extend, asMartin
and Heil put it, “indefinitely” (297). Thus there is some prospect of cap-
turing the infinite applicability of rules in the indefinitely many possible
manifestations of a disposition.
The problem is not, however, one simply of an infinite variety of pos-
sible stimuli and manifestations, for a fragile vase may break in infinitely
many slightly different ways in response to infinitely many slightly differ-
ent strikings. In this case it is theunbounded nature of the possible stimuli
and required manifestations that is problematic. If the disposition to be-
have in conformity to the “plus-rule” is understood in terms of a subjunc-
tive conditional of the form: “Were the subject to be asked to sum any two
numbers, she would give the correct answer”, then it is manifestly false
that anyone possesses this disposition.3 No one possesses this disposi-
tion – or this “subjunctive property” – because of various possibilities of
error and also because of various limitations of human agents. Someone
can have grasped the rule for addition, but remain susceptible to making
errors in particular cases. Moreover, even the most reliable human will
not be able to add some numbers correctly, for the numbers might be so
large that it takes more than a human lifetime to entertain them, let alone
perform a calculation with them.
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As the last paragraph suggests, Kripke’s criticisms of the dispositional ac-
count depend on something known as the simple conditional analysis of
dispositions:
(CA) S is disposed to yield manifestation m in response to stimulus s iff
were S to receive stimulus s it would yield manifestationm.
Let S be an individual of good but not abnormal intellectual skills. For
enormously large x and y it is almost always true that in response to the
3As Kripke stresses: 1982: 26–7.
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stimulus that is the request ‘what is x plus y?’ S would fail to yield the
manifestation of answering with ‘z’, where z = x plus y. The contrapos-
itive of the left-to-right implication of (CA) licenses the inference that S
is not disposed to yield manifestation ‘z’ in response to stimulus ‘x plus
y’. But that disposition (for all x, y, and z, where z = x plus y) is what, on
the dispositional account of meaning, meaning plus by ‘plus’ is supposed
to be. This alleged refutation of the dispositional account of meaning de-
pends crucially on (CA).
Similarly, Kripke’s criticisms (i) and (ii) have force only on the as-
sumption that if a subject does exhibitm under stimulus conditions s, that
is because the subject was disposed tom in response to s; that is, Kripke’s
criticisms assume the right-to-left implication of (CA). In response to the
request ‘what is 189 plus 277?’ S answers ‘456’ (whereas 189 plus 277
equals 466). The right-to-left implication of (CA) licenses the inference
that S was disposed to answer 456’ in response to ‘189 plus 277’ and so
the dispositional view of rules implies that by ‘plus’ S meant some bent
function for which 456 is the correct answer. Meanwhile the left-to-right
implication of (CA) again shows that Swas not disposed to give the answer
466, and so did not mean plus by ‘plus’ – and so S did not err in giving the
answer ‘456’. (CA) is thus central to Kripke’s claim that the dispositionalist
account of rules makes error impossible.
Martin and Heil are, however, able to reject Kripke’s criticisms of the
dispositional account of rule following precisely because they are able to
reject (CA), for good reasons that have been widely discussed. A disposi-
tion can be present in suitable stimulus conditions, but fail to manifest
in virtue of interfering factors, known as “finks” (Martin 1994) and “anti-
dotes” (Bird 1998).
A fink is a feature of a situation which, upon the disposition being ex-
posed to its stimulus, will act so as to remove the disposition’s causal ba-
sis before it can manifest. For instance, in an example from David Lewis
(1997), a sorcerer protects a fragile glass by waiting to see if it is struck.
If ever a striking occurs, the sorcerer will very quickly cast a spell which
makes the glass non-fragile. The spell works more quickly than the pro-
cess by which the striking leads to breaking, thus the glass, if it were
struck, would not break.
In a more prosaic example, a household fire, happily roaring in the
fireplace, is disposed to burn the entire building down should it get too
hot. However, the owners are well aware of this danger, so they have set
up a safety mechanism in the fireplace. If the fire does get that hot, a heat
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detector sets off a sprinkler system which douses the fire. The stimulus
(the fire’s being too hot) to the disposition also causes, by an indirect but
faster route, the fire to lose the very disposition in question (the disposi-
tion to destroy the building).
Antidotes – also known as masks (Johnston 1992) – work differently.
Rather than remove the disposition they interfere with its normal process
leading to manifestation. The disposition remains in place but the condi-
tions for its manifestation are removed. Continuing with the fire example,
a building could be so protected that the heat detector causes fire-proof
steel plates to fall into place around the fireplace that prevent the fire from
spreading. The fire itself is not lessened, so its disposition remains, but it
cannot have its normal effect.4
The possibility of finks and antidotes show that the left to right im-
plications of (CA) are false. Each has its converse that shows the right to
left implication to be false. A finkish circumstance may be set up so that a
disposition is absent. But on the occurrence of its appropriate stimulus a
finkish mechanism brings the disposition into existence quickly enough
for it to combinewith the stimulus to bring about themanifestation. Thus
at the time t when the stimulus occurred, the disposition was absent, yet
themanifestation subsequently occurred, and so it was true at t that were
the stimulus to occur the manifestation would occur. A mimic (Johnston
1992) to a disposition will not bring the disposition into existence but
nonetheless brings about its characteristic manifestation in response to
its stimulus by other means. For example, an iron cooking pot is not frag-
ile, but does breakwhen struck, since attached to the pot is a grenadewith
a sensitive detonator. The counterfactual on the right of (CA) is true, but
not the dispositional claim on its left.
In the case of dispositions which are the basis of rule-possession,
Martin and Heil suggest that it might be the case that these dispositions
are also vulnerable to finkish or masking interference. It is their hope,
then, that an agent who is following the plus-rule does indeed possess a
4Some cases seem to blur the distinction between finks and antidotes. For instance,
consider a building which is disposed to burn down if a fire is lit in the lobby. A fire is
lit in the lobby, and some fire-fighters start to spray the building with water. The activity
of the fire-fighters is arguably fink-like, because they make the building saturated with
water, hence take away its disposition to burn down. Arguably, however, the spraying of
the water is also an antidote, as it interferes with the process by which the building would
normally burn down. We see no objection to concluding that, depending on the details,
the activity of the fire-fighters could be both a fink and an antidote. A condition would
be both a fink and an antidote to D if it both removes D before D can manifest and also
interferes with those conditions that are required for the normal manifestation of D.
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disposition D, themanifestation of which is the correct answer. While it is
true that not every agent who possesses D would give the correct answer
to every sum, this is not because they lack the disposition. Rather, it is
because of the presence of interfering finkish or masking circumstances.
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The fact that finks and antidotes refute (CA) certainly opens up the pos-
sibility of reviving a dispositional account of meaning that does not fall
to Kripke’s criticisms. But for this possibility to be confirmed as actual it
must be shown that the problematic cases alluded to can indeed be ac-
counted for as finkish or antidote cases. We question whether matters are
as straightforward in this regard as Martin and Heil seem to suggest.
The first issue requiring clarification is whether it is finkishness or an-
tidotes to which Martin and Heil should be appealing. If it is the former,
then the disposition in question should be lost; if it is the latter the dispo-
sition remains but has its normal operation interfered with.5 The dispo-
sitions are ones which correspond to rules: meaning addition by “plus”,
intending to follow the rule for addition, etc. When someone makes an
error in a calculation is that typically because they lose such dispositions?
Or are they retained but interfered with? Both seem possible. Perhaps a
very large addition sum so taxes the subject’s brain that he mentally col-
lapses and ceases to grasp the rule for addition at all. Perhaps the subject
gets so confused that he starts following some other rule. These would be
cases of finkishness. But inmany cases onemay suppose that the subject’s
dispositions are left intact. If while employed on an addition sum a loud
noise distractsme and Imake a slip in carrying that I would not otherwise
have done, then I was following the same rule all along but was caused
to fail in my execution of it by interfering circumstances. Thus some of
the cases that show the falsity of (CA) with respect to rule-dispositions are
finkish cases butmany, perhapsmost, will also be antidote cases. The dis-
cussion that follows will concentrate initially on finks and then return to
antidotes.
A typical fink is an extrinsic feature of a disposition-bearer’s situation.
It is thus possible – in typical cases – to draw a clear distinction between
the intrinsic causal basis of a disposition and its extrinsic fink. An object
5Strictly speaking the disposition normally remains in antidote cases – but need not
in cases which are also fink cases – c.f. footnote 4. In what follows it is not necessary to
consider cases of combined finks and antidotes.
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possesses a disposition in virtue of its causal basis, and while an extrinsic
fink may render the associated conditional sentence false, it does noth-
ing to change the intrinsic causal basis of the disposition in question.6
Likewise, antidotes are also typically extrinsic interfering conditions, not
intrinsic ones.
Regarding the sorts of disposition which Martin and Heil believe are
the basis of rules, the factors in some cases are extrinsic – the distracting
loud noise is a clear example. However, it is less easy to be confident that
all the interfering circumstances are always extrinsic to the rule-follower.
People often make mistakes that cannot be attributed to external causes,
but are the result of their own failings. A putatively rule-following agent,
Saul, is given the task of adding adding 187 to 23, under propitious cir-
cumstances of perfect silence, plentiful but not excessive supplies of cof-
fee, not tomention pencils, paper and so forth. But he just forgets to carry
or he loses concentration and makes some other error. The causes of the
mistake are attributable to something intrinsic to Saul. Or let Saul be given
a mental arithmetic problem involving numbers too large for him to hold
in his mind. The failing again is Saul’s: if he had a better memory, a better
“head for figures”, he could have entertained andmaybe solved the prob-
lem that has defeated him.
If Martin and Heil are correct to say that Saul is a rule-follower in
virtue of a disposition, and correct to say that his error is to be explained
in terms of a fink to the relevant disposition, it would appear that both the
fink and the disposition are intrinsic to the agent at the same time.
One ought to be suspicious of this proposal: we suggest that there
is good reason to think it is not possible for an intrinsic disposition to
obtain in the presence of an intrinsic fink. This is plausible if one thinks
about classic examples of finkish scenarios, and modifies them such that
the fink is an intrinsic feature of the disposition-bearer. Suppose Lewis’s
sorcerer, protecting the fragile glass, decided that, to be on the safe side,
he would enchant the glass in such a way that it has an intrinsic prop-
erty which would cause it, when struck, to lose the molecular structure
6It has recently been argued by Jennifer McKitrick that (1) dispositions need not have
any causal basis (2003b) and that (2) dispositions can be extrinsic (in particular, they may
have extrinsic causal bases) (2003a). Martin and Heil reject the idea of a dispositional
property having a distinct causal basis, but also reject the idea that a disposition could
be “bare”, lacking any causal basis. Thus it is easiest to treat their view as one whereby
the dispositions they are interested in are intrinsic properties which are identical to their
causal basis. While this viewmay encounter difficulties with respect to some dispositions,
for current purposes Martin and Heil need only defend it with respect to the particular
dispositions of human agents which are the basis of rule-possession.
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which, under normal circumstances, is the causal basis of fragility. In
other words, he gives the glass an additional intrinsic property, which
is fink-like with respect to the original fragility of the glass. The glass, if
struck, would not break, because of the enchantment. It seems plausible
to say that such a glass is simply not fragile. It has lost the disposition of
fragility because it has lost its intrinsic causal basis for fragility. This loss
of the causal basis has occurred not by removing the molecular structure,
but by adding another intrinsic property – the enchantment – which we
do not typically associate with the molecular structure of glass.
It is important in such cases to be clear about the precise entity to
which the disposition is being attributed. A uranium pile above critical
mass is disposed to meltdown.7 But external to the pile are boron mod-
erating rods connected to a fail-safe mechanism that in response to high
levels of radiation drop the rods into the pile thereby stopping the melt-
down. Consider the uranium alone. It retains its disposition formeltdown
all along (the intrinsic basis of highly fissile U-235 atoms remains). Con-
sider the uranium plus boron rods in the raised position. This has the
disposition to meltdown, as would occur if this arrangement does not
change. However the fail-safe mechanism changes the intrinsic relation-
ship between rods and uranium, lowering the rods into the pile, so that
now the composite entity has no meltdown disposition. Hence, in the
presence of the fail-safe mechanism, the combination of uranium and
moderating rods has its disposition to meltdown finkishly. Now consider
the combination of uranium, boronmoderating rods, and fail-safemech-
anism. That combination has no disposition to meltdown (assuming that
the fail-safe mechanism works as it should). The lesson is that an object x
may have a disposition finkishly in virtue of some extrinsic mechanism y.
But if y is part of some combined object x′, and so the fink is intrinsic to
x′, then x′ lacks the disposition altogether.8
The forgoing considerations concern intrinsic finks. Do they extend
7This example is borrowed from Bird 1998.
8See Choi 2005: 499–500, whose “nomic duplicate” heuristic for determining whether
or not an object has a disposition coincides with this thought. Choi’s suggestion is that,
if we are unclear whether an object has a disposition, perhaps due to strange, possibly
finkish, circumstances, we ought to ask ourselves: is there a possible intrinsic duplicate
of this object, subject to the same laws of nature (a “nomic duplicate”) which clearly does
possess the disposition? Applying this test to an object like the enchanted glass will never
yield a case where it is clear that the object has the disposition, because all possible in-
trinsic duplicates of the glass will also possess the enchantment.
See also Handfield Forthcoming where Choi’s point is developed so as to apply to all
dispositions, both intrinsic and extrinsic.
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to intrinsic antidotes/masks? It seems that they do. Consider Joon and
Jim. Joon is lactose intolerant, which is to say that normally the inges-
tion of lactose (contained in milk) causes discomfort, since Joon does not
produce the enzyme lactase which metabolizes lactose. In contrast Jim’s
body does produce lactase. Occasionally Joon drinksmilky beverages, but
in order to avoid the discomfort this would normally cause, he mixes lac-
tase into his drink so that while themilk is in his gut the lactose it contains
is broken down by the lactase he consumed with it, just as it would be in
Jim’s gut, except that in the latter case the lactase is produced naturally.
Even when drinking milk mixed with lactase Joon still has the lactose in-
tolerant disposition, only the lactase in the drink acts as an antidote. But
why not say then that Jim is also lactose intolerant and that his (naturally-
produced) lactase also acts as an antidote? The reason why not is that we
regard Jim’s lactase production as a process that is intrinsic to Jimwhereas
Joon’s ingestion of lactase mixed into his drink is extrinsic to Joon. Jim’s
case shows that his possession of (what would be) an intrinsic antidote to
a disposition D (lactose intolerance) means that he does not have D at all.
We can conclude therefore that as regards both fink and antidote
cases if S contains an intrinsic fink or antidote to some dispositionD, then
S does not possess D. If that conclusion is correct, then Martin and Heil’s
defence of the dispositionalist account of rule-following cannot work in
many of the relevant cases, those where the failure of the rule-follower
to act in accord with the rule is a consequence of factors intrinsic to the
rule-follower.
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The conclusion we reached in the preceding section may be contested.
According to Michael Fara9, at least for some objects and for some dis-
positions that we ascribe to those objects, there are some cases where it is
plausible that an object can instantiate both a disposition and an intrinsic
mask to that disposition. Fara uses examples such as the disposition to get
a stomach-ache from eating highly acid foods like lemons. Suppose I have
that disposition. However, if I consume somemilk before having a lemon,
my disposition will be – for a short time – masked by the milk: I won’t get
a stomach-ache at all. Plausibly, the milk acts as an intrinsic mask to my
disposition to get a stomach-ache. It changesmy intrinsic properties such
9“Masked Abilities and Compatibilism”, unpublished ms. Draft version of 9 February,
2007.
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that the process from ingesting lemon juice to having a stomach-ache is
interfered with.
Immediately after consuming the milk, but before I consume any
lemons, am I disposed to get a stomach-ache from eating lemons? Yes,
claims Fara. On the other hand, he concedes, if the change inmy intrinsic
properties is relatively permanent – achieved for instance by an operation
on my digestive tract to improve my ability to digest acidic foods – then I
will indeed lose the disposition to get a stomach-ache.
We are not sure that our intuitions track Fara’s in every case. Must we
concede that the ingested milk is intrinsic to me? Something’s being lo-
cated internally to x does not make it intrinsic to x – it is not an intrinsic
feature of my office that it has me in it. Likewise an indigestible lead pel-
let that enters my stomach along with food need not have a duplicate in
the stomach of every one of my intrinsic duplicates. Insofar as the milk
has not been digested but is simply acting as a barrier lining my stomach,
perhaps it too is not yet intrinsic to me. On the other hand, one might
feel that to the extent that the digested milk has become intrinsic it does,
albeit temporarily, remove the disposition to get a stomach ache.
Let us suppose, nonetheless, that Fara is correct. In that case, our ear-
lier claim simply needs only a small refinement. As he has conceded, an
object can possess disposition D and an intrinsic fink or antidote to D to-
gether, but only if the fink or antidote is relatively temporary. And so if an
object which putatively instantiates a disposition also instantiates a rela-
tively permanent, intrinsic fink, or a relatively permanent, intrinsic mask,
then it simply does not possess the disposition at all.
Fara’s point, if accepted, will evidently assist Martin and Heil in ex-
plaining some cases of failure to follow a rule. But his concession means
that their explanation fails for other cases.
Here is a case to which their explanation will still apply. Suppose that
Saul fails to successfully compute a sum because he is temporarily under
the influence of alcohol. Without the alcohol in his system, let us simply
grant Martin and Heil that he does have the disposition to follow the rule
for addition. But while intoxicated, he appears to have an intrinsic fink or
mask for this disposition. According to our earlier discussion in Section
3 we would therefore conclude that he has simply lost the disposition. If
Fara is correct, however, provided that the intoxication is a relatively tem-
porary property of Saul, it would still be correct to say that he has the dis-
position to follow the rule, even while he is so intoxicated that he cannot
manifest this disposition.
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But not all cases are like this. Some of the intrinsic factors that inter-
fere with our ability to do sums correctly are both intrinsic and relatively
permanent. Most obviously, my inability to hold twenty digit numbers in
my head or my inability to write down numerals with 1010 digits are in-
trinsic masks to the plus-disposition that are relatively permanent. An
imperfect power of concentration may also be permanent. So our com-
plaint against Martin and Heil goes through: if the finkish or antidote-like
features of an agent which prevent the agent from correctly following a
rule are both intrinsic and permanent, then it is not correct to say that the
agent nonetheless has a disposition to follow the rule.10
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But let us try to allow Martin and Heil that an intrinsic disposition can
be co-instantiated with an intrinsic fink for that disposition. Consider the
disposition of a human body to wither and decay within the next 200
years. This disposition is, plausibly, intrinsic and is certainly highly en-
during. One could perhaps inhibit the expression of this disposition by a
cryogenic procedure, but that would not remove the body’s disposition to
decay; it would rather be an antidote to that disposition. Thus it is true
that:
1. Saul is disposed to wither and decay within the next 200 years.
Now consider an instance of the plus rule, x plus y, which requires at least
200 years to apply, due to the very great magnitude of the numbers x and
y involved. Martin and Heil wish to maintain that an agent such as Saul
10To be fair to Martin and Heil, they do appear to prefer to talk of capacities rather than
dispositions. And while clearly the concepts of disposition and of capacity are similar,
theremight be crucial differences, at least in ordinary parlance. In particular, it seems that
ascribing a capacity to someone is to make a weaker claim than to ascribe a disposition
to them. I am certainly capable of smoking. I have that capacity (that power, that ability).
But I am not disposed to do so. Conversely, however, it is hard to imagine someone having
a disposition to do something for which they lack the capacity.
Even if capacities are weaker than dispositions, they nonetheless suffer also from finks
and antidotes. If wewere to rephrase the current discussion in terms of capacities, it could
still proceed as currently. Let us consider the capacity to follow the plus-rule. The intrinsic
and enduring features of humans, in virtue of which we die and decay (see Section 5), are
surely incompatible with having the capacity to follow this rule for very large x and y. So
even if Martin and Heil can point to intrinsic differences between Don and Van in virtue
of which they have different capacities to add small numbers, it remains the case that
the capacities of Don do not straightforwardly show that he is following plus, rather than
some other rule, which will return deviant values for sums such as x plus y.
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could possess the plus rule, in virtue of a disposition to give the correct
answer to this sum.
2. Saul is disposed to give the correct answer to the question ‘what is x
plus y?’.
Giving the correct answer, however, is not compatible with withering and
decaying. And giving the correct answer is not physically possible in less
than two hundred years.
So Saul is – supposedly – both disposed to wither and decay within
two hundred years, but also disposed to give the correct answer to the
sum of x and y, even though to give that answer would require living for
at least 200 more years.
Is it possible for an agent to be “oppositely disposed” in this fashion?
To put it more bluntly, could an object be disposed both to φ and not to
φ, under the same stimulus conditions?11
Remarkably, David Lewis (1997, 157) entertained this possibility. He
suggested that an object which was disposed to break when struck could
also possess an intrinsic fink to its fragility. Such an object, he said, would
be both disposed to break when struck, and disposed not to break when
struck. While doubtful about the coherence of this response, we shall
grant that it is not immediately objectionable to see what its implications
are for Martin and Heil.
If Martin and Heil were to embrace this account of the compatibil-
ity of Saul’s intrinsic disposition to decay and his rule-disposition D, they
would have to give some account of why possessing D suffices for posses-
sion of the rule, despite the presence of the contrary disposition to decay.
Given the foregoing, the simplest and most natural account of rule
possession clearly will not work:
(R) S possesses a given rule just in case S possesses a disposition to give
responses in conformity with that rule.
For on this simple account, an agent like Saul possesses not only the plus-
rule, but also various deviant rules. For Saul no doubt instantiates very
many finks (and antidotes) for the disposition for plus. He has limited
memory, and so will not be able to entertain large numbers or he will for-
get things while calculating. He makes mistakes due to his tendency for
daydreaming. And so on. Each of these finks gives rise to a disposition
11Wewill assume that the dispositions under consideration are deterministic. It ismuch
less implausible that an object could have both of two probabilistic dispositions with in-
compatible manifestations. Thanks to Allen Hazen for this point.
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to follow a rule contrary to the plus-rule. Suppose that Saul does possess
the plus rule but in carrying out the addition 189 plus 277makes amistake
and gives the answer ‘456’ on account of some intrinsic and relatively per-
manent fink, such as a poor memory, that means that he forgets to carry.
Allowing for dispositions with incompatible manifestations means it can
still be true that Saul has the disposition to answerwith the correct answer
‘466’. Nonetheless it is also true that Saul has the disposition to answer
‘456’. Given (R), however, this means that Saul possesses – and, presum-
ably, was following on this occasion – both the plus-rule and somedeviant
rule for which ‘456’ is the correct answer. So Saul appears to be conform-
ing to multiple contrary rules at the same time. This is a pyrrhic victory
for Martin and Heil.
What is required is some reason to suppose that one of Saul’s many
properties is the basis for a privileged disposition which constitutes his
possessing the plus-rule. And given that many properties are causally rel-
evant to Saul’s behaviour, there needs to be some principled basis for dis-
tinguishing one disposition as deserving of this title. This we call the priv-
ileging problem, and we believe it is a pressing one for this approach.
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One possible line of answer to the privileging problem is to suggest that
Saul’s possession of the rule is marked out by some component of his ner-
vous system having the relevant disposition, while all the finks and anti-
dotes to this disposition are thought to be somehow separate from this
component – thus generating the required separation between disposi-
tion and interfering factors. Indeed, Martin and Heil distinguish between
an object’s overall “dispositional condition” and the “components” of said
condition. The components are themselves “a sort of capacity”, involving
“possession of a particular dispositional condition” (300–1). Their thought
appears to be that while the agent’s dispositional condition might not di-
rectly include the disposition that is the basis of possessing a rule, the
agent’s condition might have a suitable component which bears the right
disposition.
Consider a pocket calculator with a ten-digit display, a corresponding
ten-digit limit to both input and output, and an equally limited memory.
Onemight think of the process of performing an addition on this calcula-
tor as a matter of deploying various distinct modules. The display records
the input and shows the output; the memory stores the input and vari-
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ous products of calculation; and a processor carries out a calculation on
the numbers stored (encoded) in the memory. One might think that the
third of these is where the plus-rule is really carried out. The display and
memory are tangential. It is true that the calculator is limited in what it
can output and therefore it is limited in which additions it can perform.
On the other hand that limitation is not due to any fact about the proces-
sor, which is the module we regard as responsible for the plus-rule. That
module can add any two numbers given to it. To extend the calculator’s
adding capacity the display andmemory would need to be upgraded, but
not the processor. Likewise we might hope to find some component of
Saul’s nervous system that embodies the plus-rule and plus-disposition
that is distinct from those parts that act as finks and antidotes to the plus-
disposition.
While we think that some development of this proposal may be illu-
minating, as it stands it is still inadequate.
Oneway of construing the proposal is to suppose that, by focusing on
components, we are introducing a physical separation between the part
of the nervous system that instantiates the disposition which grounds
the rule and the parts of the nervous system which instantiate various
defeating dispositions such as finks and antidotes. As a result, any finks
or antidotes would be extrinsic to the component which instantiates the
rule-grounding disposition, and the dispositional account would not be
threatened.
This way of understanding the proposal, however, makes at best in-
complete progress in answering the objection. It might help with anti-
dotes or finks that arise from an inadequatememory for large input num-
bers. But it cannot help with the problem of decay that was raised in the
preceding section. For whatever part of the brain is said to bear the rule-
grounding disposition, that part of the brain will itself be a physical entity
made of grey organic matter, subject to various processes of decay and
decomposition. Therefore, as before, for any putative rule-grounding dis-
position in any physical part of the brain, there will be factors intrinsic
to the relevant part of the brain which render it false that the disposition
obtains.
A further problem concerns, again, the precise entity to which the
disposition is being attributed. Hitherto we have been understanding
the relevant dispositions as behavioural dispositions – dispositions man-
ifested by answers to questions. That may be too restrictive a conception
of the those dispositions, which can also be manifested in acts of silent
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mental arithmetic. But, either way, the manifestations are still those that
are attributable only to a whole person, not to sub-personal components.
So there remains the problem of linking the intended whole-person dis-
position to a subpersonal disposition of a rather different kind. Note that
the subpersonal disposition may not be a simple subpersonal analogue
of the whole-person disposition. Indeed, in the absence of the memory
components (which have been factored out since they have amasking ef-
fect), what results may not lookmuch like a disposition to addmulti-digit
numbers. The overall algorithm will be recursive, the principal adding
step will involve, on the nth iteration, adding two single-digit numbers
(the nth digits in the two multi-digit numbers to be added – and adding
1 if required, when there is carrying from the (n − 1)th iteration). To get
from that process to what can be regarded as the adding of two multi-
digit numbers is likely to require the employment of memory, the very
component we were excluding from consideration.
The final issue is that the privileging problemhas not been answered,
but has simply been transferred to a different location. The requirement
remains, that a principled reason should be given for circumscribing
some particular part of the subject as that which fixes the dispositions to
be attributed to the whole. Why is it the processor alone that fixes the dis-
position of the whole and not the part that is the processor plus memory,
which would ascribe a different disposition to the whole? The privileging
problemhas beenmoved frombeing a problemof selecting the privileged
disposition of the whole to the problem of selecting the privileged part of
the whole.
We have looked at the response that seeks to attribute a disposition to
the whole on the basis of the dispositions of a proper physical part of the
whole. Another way of interpreting this line of reply is to suppose that the
separation between components is a separation into distinct properties of
the whole. But what kinds of properties? If single dispositional properties,
then we are exactly at the point we reached at the end of the preceding
section. Certainly, there may be many properties of the person that may
be manifested in the behaviour of an agent. Abstracting the properties
away fromeach other, each property can perhaps be associatedwith a dif-
ferent rule. But in virtue of what do Martin and Heil say that just some of
these properties constitute the disposition to follow the rule in question?
So it looks as if the properties in question must be property-complexes
that are the causal bases of the dispositions we are looking for. For ex-
ample, it may be that it is certain properties of the neurons plus their ar-
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rangement that allows one to compute the plus-function. This complex
of properties may be abstracted away from the property of the neurons
that is their being made out of organic material disposed to decay. This
complex of properties might, in principle, be a complex of properties also
possessed by a non-biological entity. This complex will support the as-
cription of the plus-disposition. Still, the principal problem remains, that
of finding a principled reason for privileging this complex of properties
rather than any other. So for example, Saul also possesses the complex of
properties that is the combination of this one plus the property of being
made out of decay-prone organic material, which has an inbuilt fink or
antidote to the plus-rule and so may be considered to be the basis for a
deviant alternative (in answer to ‘what is x plus y?’ answer with x plus y
for small and moderately large x or y, otherwise get sick and die’).
Note that our objection is not that Martin and Heil cannot succeed
in answering the privileging problem. It is indeed plausible that some fu-
ture neuropsychologists will be in a position to answer questions like this.
Indeed those who think that the mind is modular also need to come up
with an answer to an analogue of the privileging problem – what is it that
requires us to identify certain parts of the brain or certain dispositions or
property-complexes as being modules, whereas other ways of carving up
the brain or its properties do not correspond to modules. An evolution-
ary account might be one possible answer, which would link the current
question to that of evolutionary accounts of biological function. Our aim
here is certainly not to argue that a dispositional account of rule-following
is impossible. But neither is it to suggest how an answer to the privileging
problem might rehabilitate the dispositional account. Rather we wish to
show that the philosophical task of distinguishing between the good and
bad dispositional factors has not even been commenced by Martin and
Heil, nor, to our knowledge, by any other defender of the dispositional ac-
count of rule-following.
7
We are sympathetic to Martin and Heil’s anti-scepticism with respect to
rule-following. Certainly they are right to point out that Kripke’s criticisms
of the dispositional account assumed (but not explicitly) the simple con-
ditional analysis of dispositions, (CA). And they were right also to point
out the falsity of (CA), a fact which clearly goes some way towards under-
miningKripke’s sceptical claims. But only so far. That is because (CA) devi-
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ates from the truth only in certain nowwell-understood kinds of case. It is
still true, as Martin (1996, 178) himself tells us, that there is some connec-
tion between dispositions and conditionals. The kinds of case in which
that connection is broken are finks and antidotes (masks). The problem
for Martin and Heil is that the canonical cases of finks and antidotes are
extrinsic to the object which possesses the disposition in question. But in
many cases of a break-down in rule-following, the cause is intrinsic to the
object. Consequently, it looks prima facie that such cases are not cases
of disposition-plus-an-antidote (or disposition-plus-a-fink) but are cases
of the absence of that disposition – or, even more pressingly, cases of the
absence of that disposition and the presence of some other disposition
with the same stimulus but incompatible manifestation. Which is, un-
fortunately for the dispositional account of rule-following, exactly what
Kripke was claiming in the first place.
If, however, we do permit the existence of a disposition in an object
that also has an intrinsic fink or antidote to that disposition, then we are
forced to concede that there are many other dispositions that an object
has, including dispositions that havemanifestations inconsistent with the
manifestation of the disposition we are interested in. In which case we
now face the privileging problem: on what principle do we single out one
of these as the disposition that corresponds to the rule that the subject
is following? The privileging problem may have an answer. Finding that
answer is amajor challenge that defenders of the dispositional account of
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